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Yard Sign Do’s and Don’ts: How to Avoid Legal Challenges to Municipal Sign Codes this Election Season

As the nation heads into the tail end of the 2020 general election, municipalities will inevitably face challenges as they seek to regulate the seasonal proliferation of yard signs on residential property. While the matter may seem trifling, a seemingly benign yet content-based sign ordinance can result in significant legal exposure for municipalities that have not heeded recent Supreme Court decisions on content neutrality. 

In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 576 U.S. 155 (2015), the Supreme Court of the United States held that “[g]overnment regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.” Because content-based laws are presumptively unconstitutional, sign ordinances that impose restrictions based “entirely on the communicative content of the sign” must satisfy strict scrutiny to pass muster under the First Amendment. 

As a result of Reed, municipalities with sign codes pre-dating 2015 should ensure that their current regulations satisfy the requirements of content neutrality. In short, this means that cities cannot regulate yard signs by implementing any rule, regulation, or ordinance that facially distinguishes between signs based on the topic discussed, the function or purpose of the sign, and most of all, the speaker’s viewpoint. 

In his concurring opinion in Reed, Justice Alito offered guidance to municipalities seeking to enforce content-neutral sign regulations, and examples include the following: 

  • Rules regulating the size of signs [note: such rules cannot be “under inclusive” and should apply to all signs based on content-neutral criteria (i.e., whether the sign is in a residential or commercial zoning district). Under no circumstance should size restrictions be contingent on a sign’s topic, purpose, function, or viewpoint].
  • Rules regulating the locations in which signs may be placed. These rules may distinguish between free-standing signs and those attached to buildings.
  • Rules distinguishing between lighted and unlighted signs.
  • Rules distinguishing between signs with fixed messages and electronic signs with messages that change.
  • Rules that distinguish between the placement of signs on private and public property.
  • Rules distinguishing between the placement of signs on commercial and residential property.
  • Rules distinguishing between on-premises and off-premises signs.
  • Rules restricting the total number of signs allowed per mile of roadway.
  • Rules imposing time restrictions on signs advertising a one-time event. Rules of this nature do not discriminate based on topic or subject and are akin to rules restricting the times within which oral speech or music is allowed.
  • In addition to regulating signs put up by private actors, government entities may also erect their own signs consistent with the principles that allow governmental speech. For example, they may put up all manner of signs to promote safety, as well as directional signs and signs pointing out historic sites and scenic spots.

Municipalities looking to update or enforce their existing sign codes (or to implement new regulations altogether) should consult with experienced legal counsel to understand how to maintain content-neutrality consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Reed. BMD’s Governmental Liability Practice Group has experience defending cities in First Amendment challenges and has the resources to assist your community with drafting, updating, and implementing constitutionally compliant sign codes. For more information, please contact BMD Member Robert A. Hager, Esq. or Partner Daniel J. Rudary, Esq.

 

El Contrato Escrito: La Herramienta Predilecta

No existe mejor herramienta a una disputa contractual que un documento firmado por las partes en el cual se expongan las obligaciones y acuerdos entre éstas.

New State Budget Institutes Licensure Requirement for Ohio’s Hospitals

On July 1, 2021, Governor Mike DeWine signed Ohio’s final budget codified at Ohio Revised Code 3722.01 et seq., which includes a new licensing requirement for Ohio’s hospitals. For years, Ohio was the only state in the country that did not license its hospitals. This approach will now be replaced with new, detailed requirements that will require careful review and compliance. Here are some of the highlights concerning these new changes:

Healthcare Provisions in the Ohio FY 22-23 Budget

Governor Mike DeWine signed Ohio’s Fiscal Year 2022-2023 budget bill (HB 110) into law on July 1, 2021. At almost 1,000 pages and 74.1 billion dollars, the budget lays out the State’s spending for the next two years. Below are a few highlighted provisions from the budget that will be important for the healthcare industry in Ohio

Interim Final Rule for Surprise Billing

In an effort to implement the new bipartisan No Surprises Act, on July 1, 2021, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), along with the Departments of Labor and Treasury, issued an interim final rule to safeguard patients against unforeseen medical bills arising from out-of-network care.

President Biden Seeks to Limit Non-Compete Agreements

Today, President Biden announced he would issue an Executive Order that calls on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to adopt rules to curtail worker non-compete agreements. Interestingly, a week ago, the FTC approved changes to its Rules of Practice to modernize and expedite the way it issues Trade Regulation Rules. If you have followed our alerts, we predicted the elimination of non-competes would probably happen. In 2016, then-Vice President Biden was a vocal opponent against non-compete agreements. He led the Obama administration’s initiative seeking to limit or eliminate non-compete agreements. In his presidential campaign, Biden promised to “work with Congress to eliminate all non-compete agreements, except the very few that are absolutely necessary to protect a narrowly defined category of trade secrets . . ..”